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Physical-Layer Security for Spectrum Sharing
Systems
Yulong Zou, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we examine the physical-layer security
for a spectrum sharing system consisting of multiple source-
destination pairs, which dynamically access their shared spec-
trum for data transmissions in the presence of an eavesdropper.
We propose a source cooperation (SC) aided opportunistic jam-
ming framework for protecting the transmission confidentiality of
the spectrum sharing system against eavesdropping. Specifically,
when a source node is allowed to access the shared spectrum for
data transmissions, another source is opportunistically selected
in the spectrum sharing system to transmit an artificial noise
for disrupting the eavesdropper without affecting the legitimate
transmissions. We present two specific SC aided opportunistic
jamming schemes, namely the SC aided random jammer selection
(RJS) and optimal jammer selection (OJS), which are referred
to as the SC-RJS and SC-OJS, respectively. We also consider the
conventional non-cooperation as a baseline. We derive closed-
form intercept probability expressions for the non-cooperation,
SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes, based on which their secrecy
diversity gains are determined through an asymptotic intercept
probability analysis in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region.
It is proved that the conventional non-cooperation exhibits a
secrecy diversity of zero, whereas the proposed SC-RJS and
SC-OJS achieve a higher secrecy diversity of one. This also
surprisingly means that no additional secrecy diversity gain
is achieved by the optimal jammer selection compared to the
random selection strategy. In addition, numerical results show
that the intercept probability performance of the SC-OJS is
always better than that of the SC-RJS and non-cooperation, even
when the legitimate channel is worse than the eavesdropping
channel.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, spectrum sharing, inter-
cept probability, secrecy diversity, diversity gain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum sharing allows heterogeneous wireless networks
to coexist and access the same spectrum resource in a dy-
namic manner, also called dynamic spectrum access [1], [2],
which has the advantage of increasing the spectrum utilization
over the conventional static spectrum access. The concept of
spectrum sharing was proposed in cognitive radio networks
to enable an unlicensed wireless system to opportunistically
access a licensed spectrum band, such as the TV band that
is dedicated to broadcast television networks, but not used
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by the dedicated networks at a particular time, referred to as
a TV white space [3]. As observed, the licensed television
networks have higher priority than other unlicensed wireless
networks in accessing their shared TV spectrum. Recently,
spectrum sharing was examined for long term evolution (LTE)
in unlicensed spectrum e.g. the 5GHz band which is populated
by Wi-Fi devices [4], where different wireless networks should
have the same priority for the spectrum access. Due to the
broadcast nature of radio propagation, any active transmis-
sions operated over the shared spectrum by different wireless
networks may be readily overheard by an eavesdropper and
is extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping [5]. It is therefore
of importance to investigate the confidentiality protection
of spectrum-sharing communications against eavesdropping
attack.
Physical-layer security emerges as an effective means of
securing wireless communications against eavesdropping by
exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless channels [6].
It was proved in [7] that a source node can communicate
with its destination in perfect secrecy from an information-
theoretic perspective, when the main channel spanning from
the source to destination has a better condition than the wiretap
channel spanning from the source to eavesdropper. In [8],
Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman introduced the notion of
secrecy capacity which is shown as the difference between
the capacity of the main channel and that of the wiretap
channel. Later on, extensive research efforts were devoted to
improving the secrecy capacity of wireless communications in
fading environments by employing the artificial noise [9]-[12]
and beamforming techniques [13]-[15]. More specifically, as
discussed in [9]-[12], the artificial noise is a special signal
designed in the null space of the main channel, which is
emitted to interfere with the eavesdropper without affecting the
legitimate destination. By contrast, beamforming techniques
as studied in [13]-[15] enable the source to transmit its
confidential signal in a particular direction to ensure that the
received signals at the destination and eavesdropper experience
constructive and destructive interference, respectively, thus
leading to a significant performance improvement in terms of
the secrecy capacity.
Recently, physical-layer security was further examined for
cognitive radio networks [16], [17], where the rate of cognitive
transmissions is maximized without causing any confidential
information leakage to the eavesdropper. In [18] and [19], relay
selection was studied for enhancing the physical-layer security
of cognitive radio communications against eavesdropping. It
was shown that the secrecy outage probability of cognitive
transmission relying on relay selection is significantly reduced
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with an increasing number of relay nodes. In [20], multiuser
scheduling was considered as an alternative means of im-
proving the physical-layer security of cognitive transmissions
and the corresponding secrecy capacity was evaluated over
Rayleigh fading channels. More recently, in [21], we investi-
gated the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) for cognitive radio
networks and proposed two relay selection schemes, namely
the single-relay and multi-relay selection. Specifically, the
single-relay selection chooses the “best” relay only for assist-
ing cognitive transmissions, whereas the multi-relay selection
allows multiple relays to participate in protecting cognitive
radio networks against eavesdropping.
In this paper, we explore physical-layer security for a
spectrum sharing system, where multiple source-destination
pairs share the same spectrum resource in the face of an
eavesdropper. We consider that the eavesdropper constantly
monitors the spectrum of interest and can overhear any
confidential messages transmitted over the shared spectrum.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows. First, we propose a source cooperation (SC) aided
opportunistic jamming framework for improving the physical-
layer security of spectrum sharing systems, where different
source nodes cooperate with each other in defending against
eavesdropping. Secondly, we present two specific SC aided
opportunistic jamming schemes, namely the SC aided random
jammer selection (RJS) and optimal jammer selection (OJS),
denoted by the SC-RJS and SC-OJS, respectively. To be
specific, when a source is scheduled to access the shared
spectrum for transmitting to its destination, another source
node is randomly chosen in the SC-RJS to emit an artifi-
cial noise for preventing the eavesdropper, whereas the SC-
OJS would select the “best” source node for protecting the
transmission confidentiality against eavesdropping. Thirdly,
we derive closed-form intercept probability expressions for the
conventional non-cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS
and SC-OJS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. Finally,
secrecy diversity gains of the non-cooperation, SC-RJS and
SC-OJS schemes are characterized through an asymptotic
intercept probability analysis in the high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) region. We prove that the SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes
achieve a secrecy diversity of one, but the non-cooperation has
a secrecy diversity of zero only, showing the secrecy benefit of
proposed source cooperation framework in defending against
eavesdropping.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the spectrum-sharing system model as well as
proposes the SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes. For comparison
purposes, the conventional non-cooperation is also described
in this section. Next, we derive closed-form intercept proba-
bility expressions for the non-cooperation, SC-RJS and SC-
OJS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels in Section III,
followed by Section IV, where the secrecy diversity analysis
is presented. Then, numerical results are provided in Section
V. Finally, Section VI gives some concluding remarks.
Fig. 1. A general spectrum sharing system comprised of N multiple source-
destination pairs in the presence of a common eavesdropper (E).
II. SOURCE COOPERATION AIDED OPPORTUNISTIC
JAMMING
In this section, we first present the model of a gen-
eral spectrum sharing system consisting of multiple source-
destination pairs, which are allowed to dynamically share the
same spectrum, while an eavesdropper is considered to be
capable of overhearing and taping any active transmissions
operated over the shared spectrum of interest. Then, a source
cooperation (SC) aided opportunistic jamming framework is
proposed for improving the physical-layer security of spectrum
sharing system against eavesdropping.
A. System Model and Problem Formulation
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a spectrum sharing
system, where N source-destination pairs coexist and dynam-
ically share the same spectrum. Throughout this paper, we
assume that the N source-destination pairs are coordinated
e.g. through a common spectrum database [23], [24], which
guarantees that all the source nodes can orderly access their
shared spectrum without signal interference. The design of
a specific spectrum sharing policy [25] should consider both
the spectrum efficiency and sharing fairness between different
user pairs, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Although
the focus of this paper is on the secrecy diversity analysis
of coordinated source-destination pairs in the presence of an
eavesdropper, similar secrecy diversity results can be obtained
for the uncoordinated case, where different source-destination
pairs may interfere with each other.
For notational convenience, let Hi denote that the shared
spectrum is allocated to the source-destination pair i, where
i is in the range from 1 to N . To be specific, given Hi, it
means that the source-destination pair i is allowed to access the
spectrum and the source Si starts to transmit to its destination
Di. Without loss of generality, let αi = Pr(Hi) represent the
probability that the shared spectrum becomes available to the
source-destination pair i, which can also be interpreted as the
percentage of time period in which the source-destination pair
i is actively occupying over the shared spectrum, called duty
cycle. Clearly, the duty cycle αi should be in the range from
0 to 1 and the sum of all the source-destination pairs’ duty
cycles should satisfy
0 ≤
N∑
i=1
αi ≤ 1, (1)
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where N represents the number of source-destination pairs.
Meanwhile, as shown in Fig. 1, an eavesdropper (E) is consid-
ered to tap any active transmissions operated over the spectrum
shared by N source-destination pairs. As a consequence, when
the Si transmits to the Di, the E is assumed to be capable
of overhearing the Si-Di transmission. It is pointed out that
all the wireless links between any two nodes of Fig. 1 are
modeled as independent Rayleigh fading channels. In addition,
any receiver of Fig. 1 is assumed to be deteriorated by a zero-
mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with a variance
of N0.
Without loss of generality, we consider that the Si starts
to transmit its signal xi at a power of Ps. Thus, the received
signal at the Di can be written as
yi = hsidi
√
Psxi + ni, (2)
where hsidi represents the fading gain of Si-Di channel
and ni represents the AWGN encountered at the Di. Using
the Shannon’s capacity formula, we obtain an instantaneous
capacity of Si-Di transmission from (2) as
Csidi = log2(1 + |hsidi |
2γs), (3)
where γs = Ps/N0 is referred to as the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of radio
propagation, the E also overhears the signal transmission of
Si and thus the corresponding received signal is expressed as
ye = hsie
√
Psxi + ne, (4)
where hsie represents the fading gain of Si-E channel and ne
represents the AWGN encountered at the E. Similarly to (3),
an instantaneous capacity of the wiretap channel from the Si
to E is given by
Csie = log2(1 + |hsie|
2γs). (5)
Following the physical-layer security literature [8]-[16], a
perfect secrecy can be achieved only when an instantaneous
capacity of the main channel Csidi (spanning from Si to Di) is
higher than that of the wiretap channel Csie (spanning from Si
to E). If an instantaneous capacity of the main channel Csidi
drops below that of the wiretap channel Csie, the E would
be capable of successfully decoding the source signal and an
intercept event is considered to happen [19]. In this paper,
the probability of occurrence of an intercept event (referred to
as intercept probability) is used to measure the physical-layer
security of spectrum sharing systems.
B. SC aided Opportunistic Jamming
In this section, we propose the use of so-called SC aided
opportunistic jamming for protecting the spectrum sharing
system against eavesdropping, where the N source-destination
pairs of Fig. 1 are enabled to cooperate with each other. To be
specific, when a source node is allowed to access the spectrum
for data transmissions, another source may be opportunistically
selected to act as a friendly jammer for interfering with the E
without affecting the legitimate transmissions. For notational
convenience, let S = {S1, S2, · · · , SN} denote the set of N
source nodes of the spectrum sharing system, as shown in
Fig. 1. Without loss of generality, we consider that the Si
is scheduled to access the spectrum and starts to transmit its
signal xi. In order to protect the source transmission, a friendly
jammer denoted by J is opportunistically chosen among the
remaining idle source nodes to emit an artificial noise for
confusing the E. Note that the total transmit power of the
source Si and the selected friendly jammer Sj is constrained
to Ps. For simplicity, we consider the equal power allocation
here and thus the transmit powers of the Si and Sj are given
by Ps/2.
In this paper, we assume that the artificial noise transmitted
by the selected friendly jammer is generated from a pseudo
random sequence, which is known to the legitimate receiver
and remains unknown to the eavesdropper. Thus, the legitimate
receiverDi is able to cancel out the artificial noise, while the E
is severely interfered. It is worth mentioning that the objective
of this paper is to reveal the impact of jammer selection on the
secrecy diversity of wireless communications and the artificial
noise design is not our focus. Therefore, we can express the
received signal at Di as
yi = hsidi
√
Ps
2
xi + ni, (6)
from which an instantaneous capacity of Si-Di transmission
relying on the SC aided opportunistic jamming is obtained as
CSCsidi = log2(1 + |hsidi |
2 γs
2
). (7)
Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of radio propaga-
tion, the E can also overhear the Si’s transmission. In order
to defend against eavesdropping, another source node denoted
by Sj may be selected to act as a friendly jammer, which
is employed to emit an artificial noise denoted by xn at
a power of Ps/2 for confusing the E. Again, the artificial
noise xn is pre-shared and known to the legitimate receiver
so that the Di can cancel out xn, as implied from (6). By
contrast, the artificial noise xn is assumed to be unknown
to the eavesdropper which would be interfered. Hence, the
received signal at the E can be expressed as
ye = hsie
√
Ps
2
xi + hsje
√
Ps
2
xn + ne, (8)
where hsie and hsje represent the fading gains of the channel
from Si to E and that from Sj to E, respectively. Using (8),
we obtain an instantaneous capacity of the wiretap channel
from the Si to E with the aid of the selected friendly jammer
Sj as
CSCsie(sj) = log2(1 +
|hsie|
2γs
|hsje|
2γs + 2
), (9)
where Sj ∈ {S − Si} and {S − Si} denotes the set of source
nodes S excluding a set element Si. In this paper, we consider
two opportunistic jammer selection strategies, namely the
random jammer selection (RJS) and optimal jammer selection
(OJS). To be specific, in the RJS scheme, a source node in
the set {S − Si} is randomly chosen to act as the friendly
jammer, whereas the OJS aims to minimize the confidential
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information leakage as much as possible. Hence, the RJS
criterion is described as
J = rand
Sj∈{S−Si}
Sj , (10)
where rand(·) denotes the equiprobable selection of an ele-
ment from the set {S − Si}. By contrast, in the OJS scheme,
a source node Sj that minimizes an instantaneous capacity of
the wiretap channel CSCsie(sj) is used to act as the friendlyjammer. By using (9), the OJS criterion can thus be written
as
J = min
Sj∈{S−Si}
CSCsie(sj) = max
Sj∈{S−Si}
|hsje|
2. (11)
Combining (9) and (10), we obtain an instantaneous capacity
of the wiretap channel from Si to E with the aid of the RJS
as
CSC-RJsie = rand
Sj∈{S−Si}
log2(1 +
|hsie|
2γs
|hsje|
2γs + 2
), (12)
where the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) hsje
is not needed in performing the random jammer selection.
Similarly, an instantaneous capacity of the Si-E channel with
the help of the optimal jammer can be obtained from (9) and
(11) as
CSC-OJsie = min
Sj∈{S−Si}
log2(1 +
|hsie|
2γs
|hsje|
2γs + 2
), (13)
which shows that the eavesdropper’s CSI hsje is required
to carry out the optimal jammer selection for the sake of
minimizing the confidential information leakage. Since all the
wireless links between any two nodes of Fig. 1 are modeled as
independent Rayleigh fading channels, the random variables of
|hsidi |
2
, |hsie|
2 and |hsje|2 are exponentially distributed with
respective means of σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
and σ2sje, respectively. It is
pointed out that the average fading gains σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
and σ2sje
may be different due to the fact that the sources, destinations
and eavesdropper move around and experience different path
losses.
III. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH
FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we analyze the intercept probability of SC-
RJS and SC-OJS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. For
comparison purposes, we also conduct the intercept probability
analysis of conventional non-cooperation for spectrum sharing
systems.
A. Conventional Non-cooperation
In conventional non-cooperation scheme, when the shared
spectrum is assigned to a source-destination pair i, the Si starts
to transmit its confidential information to its destination Di.
As aforementioned, an intercept event is considered to occur
when an instantaneous capacity of the main channel Csidi
falls below that of the wiretap channel Csie. Note that there
are N source-destination pairs orderly accessing their shared
spectrum. Hence, using the law of total probability, we obtain
an intercept probability of the spectrum sharing system relying
on the non-cooperation scheme as
P nonCint =
N∑
i=1
Pr(Hi) Pr(Csidi < Csie)
=
N∑
i=1
αi Pr(Csidi < Csie),
(14)
where N is the number of source-destination pairs and αi
denotes the duty cycle of the source-destination pair i. Sub-
stituting Csidi and Csie from (3) and (5) into (14) gives
P nonCint =
N∑
i=1
αi Pr(|hsidi |
2 < |hsie|
2). (15)
Noting that fading gains |hsidi | and |hsie| are modeled as
Rayleigh random variables, we can obtain that |hsidi |2 and
|hsie|
2 are exponentially distributed. Letting σ2sidi and σ
2
sie
denote the means of |hsidi |2 and |hsie|2, respectively, we have
P nonCint =
N∑
i=1
αiσ
2
sie
σ2sidi + σ
2
sie
, (16)
which gives a closed-form intercept probability of the conven-
tional non-cooperation scheme for spectrum sharing systems
in the presence of an eavesdropper. It can be observed from
(16) that the intercept probability only relates to the duty cycle
αi as well as the average channel gains σ2sidi and σ
2
sie
, but is
independent of the SNR γs.
B. SC-RJS Scheme
This subsection presents the intercept probability analysis
of SC-RJS scheme. Similarly to (14), an intercept probability
of the SC-RJS scheme is obtained as
P SC-RJint =
N∑
i=1
αi Pr(C
SC
sidi
< CSC-RJsie ), (17)
where CSCsidi and C
SC-RJ
sie
are given by (7) and (12), respectively.
Combining (7), (12) and (17), we arrive at
P SC-RJint =
N∑
i=1
αi
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
Pr(
|hsidi |
2γs
2
<
|hsie|
2γs
|hsje|
2γs + 2
, J = Sj).
(18)
As observed from (10), in the RJS, each source node in
the set {S − Si} has an equal chance to be selected as the
friendly jammer. Moreover, the RJS process is independent of
random variables |hsidi |2, |hsie|2, and |hsje|2. Therefore, we
can simplify (18) as
P SC-RJint =
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
Pr(
|hsidi |
2γs
2
<
|hsie|
2γs
|hsje|
2γs + 2
),
(19)
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which is given by
P SC-RJint =
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
Pr(|hsje|
2γs + 2 <
2|hsie|
2
|hsidi |
2
).
(20)
Denoting |hsie|2 = X , |hsidi |2 = Y , and Z = XY , we can
rewrite (20) as
P SC-RJint =
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
Pr(|hsje|
2γs + 2 < 2Z).
(21)
Meanwhile, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
random variable Z is expressed as
Pr(Z < z) = Pr(X < zY ), (22)
for z > 0. Noting that X and Y are independent and
exponentially distributed, we obtain the CDF of Z as
Pr(Z < z) =
∫ ∞
0
1
σ2sie
exp(−
x
σ2sie
)dx∫ ∞
x
z
1
σ2sidi
exp(−
y
σ2sidi
)dy,
(23)
where σ2sidi and σ
2
sie
are the respective means of |hsidi |2 and
|hsie|
2
. Using (23), we have
Pr(Z < z) =
∫ ∞
0
1
σ2sie
exp(−
x
σ2sie
−
x
σ2sidiz
)dx
=
σ2sidiz
σ2sidiz + σ
2
sie
,
(24)
from which the probability density function (PDF) of Z is
given by
pZ(z) =
σ2sidiσ
2
sie
(σ2sidiz + σ
2
sie
)
2
, (25)
for z > 0. Note that |hsje| is Rayleigh distributed, implying
that |hsje|2 follows exponential distribution with a mean of
σ2sje. Since |hsje|
2 is independent of random variable Z , we
can obtain the term Pr(|hsje|2γs+2 < 2Z) as (26) at the top
of the following page, where the parameter Ω(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
, γs)
is given by
Ω(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
, γs) =
∫ ∞
1
σ2sidiσ
2
sie
(σ2sidiz + σ
2
sie
)
2
exp(−
2z − 2
σ2sjeγs
)dz.
(27)
Denoting 2z
σ2sje
γs
+
2σ2sie
σ2
sidi
σ2sje
γs
= t, we can obtain
Ω(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
, γs) as
Ω(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
, γs) = exp(
2σ2sie + 2σ
2
sidi
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
)
×
∫ ∞
2
σ2sje
γs
+
2σ2sie
σ2
sidi
σ2sje
γs
σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γst2
exp(−t)dt,
(28)
which is rewritten as
Ω(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
, γs) = exp(ϕ)
∫ ∞
ϕ
2σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γst2
exp(−t)dt,
(29)
where the parameter ϕ is defined as
ϕ =
2
σ2sjeγs
+
2σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
. (30)
Performing the partial integration to (29), we arrive at
Ω(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
, γs) = exp(ϕ)
∫ ∞
ϕ
2σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
exp(−t)d(−t−1)
=
2σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
exp(ϕ)[
1
ϕ
exp(−ϕ)−
∫ ∞
ϕ
exp(−t)
t
dt]
=
2σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
[
1
ϕ
− exp(ϕ)Ei(ϕ)],
(31)
where Ei(ϕ) =
∫∞
ϕ
e−t
t
dt is known as the exponential integral
function. Hence, substituting Ω(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
, γs) from (31) into
(26) gives
Pr(|hsje|
2γs + 2 < 2Z) =
2σ2sie exp(ϕ)Ei(ϕ)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
. (32)
Finally, combining (21) and (32), we obtain the intercept
probability of the SC-RJS as
P SC-RJint =
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
(
2σ2sie exp(ϕ)Ei(ϕ)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
)
,
(33)
where ϕ is given by (30).
C. SC-OJS Scheme
In this subsection, we analyze the intercept probability of
SC-OJS scheme. Similarly to (17), we obtain an intercept
probability of spectrum sharing systems relying on the pro-
posed SC-OJS scheme as
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi Pr(C
SC
sidi
< CSC-OJsie ), (34)
where CSCsidi and C
SC-OJ
sie
are given by (7) and (13), respectively.
Combining (7), (13) and (34) gives
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi Pr


log2(1 +
|hsidi |
2γs
2
)
< min
Sj∈{S−Si}
log2(1 +
|hsie|
2γs
|hsje|
2γs + 2
)


=
N∑
i=1
αi Pr


log2(1 +
|hsidi |
2γs
2
)
< log2(1 +
|hsie|
2γs
max
Sj∈{S−Si}
|hsje|
2γs + 2
)


=
N∑
i=1
αi Pr(
|hsidi |
2γs
2
<
|hsie|
2γs
max
Sj∈{S−Si}
|hsje|
2γs + 2
),
(35)
which is rewritten as
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi Pr( max
Sj∈{S−Si}
|hsje|
2γs + 2 <
2|hsie|
2
|hsidi |
2
).
(36)
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Pr(|hsje|
2γs + 2 < 2Z) =
∫ ∞
1
σ2sidiσ
2
sie
(σ2sidiz + σ
2
sie
)
2
[1− exp(−
2z − 2
σ2sjeγs
)]dz
=
∫ ∞
1
σ2sidiσ
2
sie
(σ2sidiz + σ
2
sie
)
2
dz −
∫ ∞
1
σ2sidiσ
2
sie
(σ2sidiz + σ
2
sie
)
2
exp(−
2z − 2
σ2sjeγs
)dz
=
σ2sie
σ2sidi + σ
2
sie
− Ω(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
, γs),
(26)
Denoting |hsie|2 = X , |hsidi |2 = Y , and Z = XY , we have
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi Pr( max
Sj∈{S−Si}
|hsje|
2γs + 2 < 2Z). (37)
Noting again that random variable |hsje|2 is exponentially
distributed and independent of Z , we obtain (37) as
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi
∫ ∞
1
∏
Sj∈{S−Si}
[1− exp(−
2z − 2
σ2sjeγs
)]pZ(z)dz,
(38)
where PZ(z) is the PDF of random variable Z as given by
(25). Using the result of Appendix A, we obtain the intercept
probability of SC-OJS scheme from (38) as
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi[
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
∑
Sj∈Jk
(−1)
|Jk|+12σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
exp(φ)Ei(φ)],
(39)
where the parameter φ is defined as
φ =
2σ2sidi + 2σ
2
sie
σ2sidiγs
(
∑
Sj∈Jk
1
σ2sje
), (40)
where Jk represents the k-th non-empty subcollection of the
set {S − Si}. As shown in (16), (33) and (39), we have now
derived closed-form intercept probability expressions for the
conventional non-cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS
and SC-OJS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels.
IV. SECRECY DIVERSITY GAIN ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the secrecy diversity analysis
for the conventional non-cooperation, SC-RJS, and SC-OJS
schemes in high SNR region. Although the closed-form inter-
cept probability expressions as given by (16), (33) and (39)
can be used for numerical performance evaluation, they fail to
provide an insight into the impact of the number of source-
destination pairs on the physical-layer security of spectrum
sharing systems.
A. Conventional Non-cooperation
This subsection conducts an asymptotic intercept probability
analysis of conventional non-cooperation scheme and presents
its secrecy diversity gain as a baseline. As discussed in [26],
the traditional diversity gain is introduced to measure the re-
liability of wireless communications, which is mathematically
defined as
d = − lim
γs→∞
logPe(γs)
log γs
, (41)
where γs represents the SNR and Pe(γs) represents the bit
error rate (BER) as a function of γs. From (41), one can
observe that the BER behaves as 1
γsd
for γs →∞, implying
that with an increasing diversity gain d, the BER is reduced
faster in high SNR region. Similarly to (41), we introduce a
secrecy diversity gain to characterize an asymptotic behavior
of the intercept probability in high SNR, which is defined as a
ratio of the logarithmic intercept probability to the logarithmic
SNR γs, i.e.,
ds = − lim
γs→∞
logPint(γs)
log γs
, (42)
where Pint(γs) represents the intercept probability as a func-
tion of γs. From (42), we obtain a secrecy diversity gain of
the non-cooperation scheme as
dnonCs = − lim
γs→∞
logP nonCint
log γs
, (43)
where P nonCint represents the intercept probability of conven-
tional non-cooperation scheme. Substituting P nonCint from (16)
into (43) yields
dnonCs = − lim
γs→∞
log(
N∑
i=1
αiσ
2
sie
σ2
sidi
+σ2sie
)
log γs
= 0, (44)
which shows that no secrecy diversity is achieved by the con-
ventional non-cooperation. Again, this implies that increasing
the transmit power Ps would not improve the physical-layer
security of spectrum sharing systems with the non-cooperation
scheme in terms of its intercept probability.
B. SC-RJS Scheme
In this subsection, we present the secrecy diversity analysis
of the SC-RJS scheme. Using (42), we obtain a secrecy
diversity gain of the SC-RJS scheme as
dSC-RJs = − lim
γs→∞
logP SC-RJint
log γs
, (45)
where P SC-RJint is given by (33). Following [27, Eq. 5.1.20],
Ei(φ) is bounded to
1
2
exp(−ϕ) ln(1 +
2
ϕ
) ≤ Ei(ϕ) ≤ exp(−ϕ) ln(1 +
1
ϕ
), (46)
for ϕ > 0. Combining (33) and (46), we have
P SC-RJint ≤
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
[
2σ2sie ln(1 + ϕ
−1)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
]. (47)
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Substituting ϕ from (30) into (47) yields
P SC-RJint ≤
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
[
2σ2sie ln(1 +
σ2sidi
σ2sje
γs
2σ2
sidi
+2σ2sie
)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
].
(48)
Letting γs →∞, we rewrite (48) as
lim
γs→∞
P SC-RJint ≤
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
[
2σ2sie ln(γs)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
]
= [
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
(
2σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
)] ·
ln(γs)
γs
.
(49)
Combining (45) and (49), we arrive at
dSC-RJs ≥1− lim
γs→∞
log[
N∑
i=1
αi
N−1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
(
2σ2sie
σ2
sidi
σ2sje
)]
log γs
− lim
γs→∞
log[ln(γs)]
log γs
.
(50)
Considering γs →∞, we have
lim
γs→∞
log[
N∑
i=1
αi
N−1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
(
2σ2sie
σ2
sidi
σ2sje
)]
log γs
= 0, (51)
and
lim
γs→∞
log[ln(γs)]
log γs
= 0. (52)
Substituting (51) and (52) into (50) gives
dSC-RJs ≥ 1. (53)
Additionally, using (33) and (46), we obtain
P SC-RJint ≥
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
[
σ2sie ln(1 + 2ϕ
−1)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
]. (54)
Substituting ϕ from (30) into (54) gives
P SC-RJint ≥
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
[
σ2sie ln(1 +
2σ2sidi
σ2sje
γs
2σ2
sidi
+2σ2sie
)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
],
(55)
from which we have
lim
γs→∞
P SC-RJint ≥
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
[
σ2sie ln(γs)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
]
= (
N∑
i=1
αi
N − 1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
) ·
ln(γs)
γs
.
(56)
Combining (45) and (56), we arrive at
dSC-RJs ≤1− lim
γs→∞
log(
N∑
i=1
αi
N−1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
σ2sie
σ2
sidi
σ2sje
)
log γs
− lim
γs→∞
log[ln(γs)]
log γs
.
(57)
Letting γs →∞, we have
lim
γs→∞
log(
N∑
i=1
αi
N−1
∑
Sj∈{S−Si}
σ2sie
σ2
sidi
σ2sje
)
log γs
= 0. (58)
Substituting (52) and (58) into (57) yields
dSC-RJs ≤ 1. (59)
Finally, using the squeeze theorem, we obtain the secrecy
diversity gain of SC-RJS scheme from (53) and (59) as
dSC-RJs = 1, (60)
which shows that the intercept probability behaves as 1
γs
in
high SNR region. This means that the intercept probability of
the SC-RJS can be notably reduced with an increasing transmit
power, showing its secrecy advantage over the conventional
non-cooperation scheme.
C. SC-OJS Scheme
In this subsection, we analyze the secrecy diversity of the
SC-OJS. Following (42), a secrecy diversity gain of the SC-
OJS scheme is obtained as
dSC-OJs = − lim
γs→∞
log(P SC-OJint )
log γs
, (61)
where P SC-OJint is given by (39). Similarly to (46), we have
1
2
exp(−φ) ln(1 +
2
φ
) ≤ Ei(φ) ≤ exp(−φ) ln(1 +
1
φ
), (62)
where φ is given by (40). Considering γs →∞ and using (40),
we obtain
lim
γs→∞
exp(−φ) = 1, (63)
and
lim
γs→∞
ln(1 +
1
φ
) = ln(γs), (64)
and
lim
γs→∞
ln(1 +
2
φ
) = ln(γs). (65)
Combining (62)-(65), we arrive at
ln(γs) ≤ lim
γs→∞
Ei(φ) ≤ ln(γs), (66)
which in turn leads to
lim
γs→∞
Ei(φ) = ln(γs). (67)
Moreover, letting γs →∞, we similarly obtain
lim
γs→∞
exp(φ) = 1. (68)
Substituting (67) and (68) into (39), we have
lim
γs→∞
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
2αiσ
2
sie
σ2sidi
[−
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Jk|
∑
Sj∈Jk
1
σ2sje
]
×
ln(γs)
γs
.
(69)
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dSC-OJs = 1− lim
γs→∞
log
(
N∑
i=1
2αiσ
2
sie
σ2
sidi
[−
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)
|Jk| ∑
Sj∈Jk
1
σ2sje
]
)
log γs
− lim
γs→∞
log[ln(γs)]
log γs
. (70)
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Fig. 2. Intercept probability versus SNR γs of the conventional non-
cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes.
Combining (61) and (69) yields (70) at the top of the following
page. Clearly, one can readily obtain
lim
γs→∞
log
(
N∑
i=1
2αiσ
2
sie
σ2
sidi
[−
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)
|Jk| ∑
Sj∈Jk
1
σ2sje
]
)
log γs
= 0.
(71)
Therefore, substituting (52) and (71) into (70) gives
dSC-OJs = 1, (72)
which shows that the secrecy diversity gain of one is achieved
by the SC-OJS scheme. One can observe from (60) and
(72) that the SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes achieve the same
secrecy diversity gain. This surprisingly means that the optimal
jammer selection fails to provide a further performance im-
provement compared to the random jammer selection in terms
of the secrecy diversity gain.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section presents numerical intercept probability results
of the conventional non-cooperation as well as the proposed
SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes by using (16), (33) and (39).
In our numerical evaluation, the duty cycle of αi = 1/N
is considered for different source-destination pairs and the
average gains are specified to σ2sidi = σ
2
sie
= σ2sje = 1,
unless otherwise stated. For notational convenience, let λ =
σ2sidi/σ
2
sie
denote the ratio of the average gains between the
main channel and eavesdropping channel, referred to as the
main-to-eavesdropping ratio (MER). Additionally, the number
of source-destination pairs N = 4 is used, unless otherwise
mentioned.
Fig. 2 shows the intercept probability comparison among
the conventional non-cooperation, the SC-RJS, and the SC-
OJS schemes by plotting (16), (33) and (39) as a function of
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Fig. 3. Intercept probability versus the number of source-destination pairs
N of the conventional non-cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS and
SC-OJS schemes.
the SNR γs. The simulated intercept probability results are
also given in Fig. 2, where the continuous lines and discrete
markers are used to represent the theoretical and simulated
intercept probability results, respectively. It can be seen from
Fig. 2 that as the SNR γs increases, the intercept probability
of conventional non-cooperation scheme keeps unchanged,
as implied from (16). By contrast, with an increasing SNR,
the intercept probabilities of proposed SC-RJS and SC-OJS
schemes are reduced significantly. This shows the physical-
layer security benefits of exploiting the source cooperation
against eavesdropping, as compared to the conventional non-
cooperation. Additionally, one can observe from Fig. 2 that the
theoretical intercept probabilities of the non-cooperation, SC-
RJS and SC-OJS schemes match well with the corresponding
simulation results, confirming the correctness of our closed-
form intercept probability expressions of (16), (33) and (39).
Fig. 3 depicts the intercept probability versus the num-
ber of source-destination pairs N of the conventional non-
cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS and SC-OJS
schemes. As shown in Fig. 3, both the theoretical and sim-
ulated intercept probability results match each other, which
further validates our closed-form intercept probability analysis.
One can also see from Fig. 3 that with an increasing number
of source-destination pairs, the intercept probability perfor-
mance of the conventional non-cooperation remains the same,
whereas the intercept probability of the SC-RJS decreases
when N increases from N = 1 to 2 and then becomes
stable as the number of source-destination pairs N continues
to increase thereafter. This is because that given N = 1
(i.e. there is only one source-destination pair), the source
cooperation is unavailable and thus the intercept performance
of the SC-RJS in this case becomes identical to that of the
conventional non-cooperation. When N increases from N = 1
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Fig. 4. Intercept probability versus MER λ of the conventional non-
cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes.
to 2, it becomes available to exploit the SC strategy for
decreasing the intercept probability. Moreover, as the number
of source-destination pairs continues to increase more than
two, a randomly selected source node is allowed in the RJS
to act as a friendly jammer, which is not beneficial to the
physical-layer security improvement. By contrast, the OJS
scheme allows an optimal source node to be chosen as the
friendly jammer for minimizing the confidential information
leakage, hence the intercept probability of the SC-OJS always
decreases with an increasing number of source-destination
pairs, as can be observed from Fig. 3.
Fig. 4 shows the intercept probability versus MER λ of
the conventional non-cooperation as well as the proposed
SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes. It can be seen from Fig. 4
that as the MER increases, the intercept performance of the
non-cooperation, SC-RJS and SC-OJS improves accordingly,
which is because that the eavesdropping channel worsens with
an increasing MER λ. One can also observe from Fig. 4
that in the low MER region, the proposed SC-RJS and SC-
OJS significantly outperform the conventional non-cooperation
in terms of intercept probability. Moreover, as the MER
increases, the intercept probabilities of the conventional non-
cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS and SC-OJS
schemes converge to each other. This is due to the fact that
in the high MER region, the eavesdropping channel is much
worse than the main channel and the jamming signal received
at the eavesdropper may become negligible compared to the
background noise, thus the security benefit of exploiting SC
in high MER region is marginal.
In Fig. 5, we demonstrate the intercept probability versus
SNR of the conventional non-cooperation as well as the
proposed SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes for different MER
λ. As shown in Fig. 5, for both the cases of MER = −5dB
and 5dB, the conventional non-cooperation performs the worst
and the proposed SC-OJS scheme is the best in terms of
intercept probability. It can also be observed from Fig. 5
that with an increasing SNR, the intercept probability of
the conventional non-cooperation remains constant, while the
intercept performance of the SC-RJS and SC-OJS improves
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Fig. 5. Intercept probability versus SNR of the conventional non-cooperation
as well as the proposed SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes for different MER λ.
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Fig. 6. Intercept probability versus the number of source-destination pairs
N of the conventional non-cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS and
SC-OJS schemes for different MER λ.
significantly. This means that even when the eavesdropping
channel is better than the main channel (e.g., MER = −5dB),
the physical-layer security of spectrum sharing systems relying
on the SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes can be enhanced by
simply increasing the transmit power.
Fig. 6 shows the intercept probability versus the num-
ber of source-destination pairs N of the conventional non-
cooperation as well as the proposed SC-RJS and SC-OJS
schemes for different MER λ. One can observe from Fig. 6
that for both the cases of MER = −5dB and 5dB, the intercept
probabilities of the non-cooperation and SC-RJS are indepen-
dent of the number of source-destination pairs N , whereas the
intercept performance of the SC-OJS is slightly improved with
an increasing N . Therefore, increasing the number of source-
destination pairs is beneficial to the physical-layer security of
the SC-OJS, even if the main channel is much worse than the
eavesdropping channel (e.g., MER = −5dB). However, the
secrecy enhancement of the SC-OJS by increasing the number
of source-destination pairs is incremental, as seen from Fig.
6.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the physical-layer se-
curity for a spectrum sharing system consisting of multiple
source-destination pairs, each consisting of a source node
transmitting to its destination, where an eavesdropper is con-
sidered to tap an active transmission between any source-
destination pairs. We have explored a source cooperation
(SC) aided opportunistic jamming framework for protecting
the spectrum sharing system against eavesdropping. More
specifically, when a source node is allowed to access the
shared spectrum for data transmissions, another source node
is opportunistically selected to act as a friendly jammer for
confusing the eavesdropper without affecting the legitimate
transmissions. We have presented two SC aided opportunistic
jamming methods, namely the SC-RJS and SC-OJS, and
derived their intercept probability expressions in closed-form
over Rayleigh fading channels. For comparison purposes,
we have also considered the conventional non-cooperation
as a baseline. We have carried out an asymptotic intercept
probability analysis for the non-cooperation, SC-RJS and SC-
OJS in the high SNR region. It has been shown that the
conventional non-cooperation achieves a secrecy diversity of
zero only, whereas a higher secrecy diversity of one is achieved
by both the SC-RJS and SC-OJS schemes. Numerical results
have demonstrated that the proposed SC-OJS performs the
best and the conventional non-cooperation achieves the worst
secrecy performance in terms of intercept probability.
It needs to be pointed out that in this paper, we have
investigated a simple case where only single source-destination
pair is actively transmitting at a time with the aid of a single
friendly jammer in the presence of a single eavesdropper. It
is of interest to explore a more general case with multiple
concurrent source-destination transmissions, multiple jammers
and multiple eavesdroppers. In contrast to an eavesdropper,
multiple eavesdroppers can perform independently or collab-
oratively in tapping the legitimate transmissions, leading to
an increasing intercept probability. We leave this interesting
problem for future work.
APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF (39)
By using the binomial expansion theorem, the term∏
Sj∈{S−Si}
[1− exp(− 2z−2
σ2sje
γs
)] can be expanded as
∏
Sj∈{S−Si}
[1− exp(−
2z − 2
σ2sjeγs
)]
= 1 +
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Jk| exp(−
∑
Sj∈Jk
2z − 2
σ2sjeγs
),
(A.1)
where Jk represents the k-th non-empty subcollection of the
set {S − Si}. Combining (A.1) and (38), we arrive at
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi
∫ ∞
1
[1 +
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)
|Jk|
× exp(−
∑
Sj∈Jk
2z − 2
σ2sjeγs
)]pZ(z)dz,
(A.2)
where pZ(z) represents the PDF of Z . Substituting pZ(z) from
(25) into (A.2) gives
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi[Φ1(σ
2
sidi
, σ2sie)
+
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)
|Jk|Φk(σ
2
sidi
, σ2sje, σ
2
sie
)],
(A.3)
where Φ1(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
) and Φk(σ2sidi , σ
2
sje
, σ2sie) are defined as
Φ1(σ
2
sidi
, σ2sie) =
∫ ∞
1
σ2sidiσ
2
sie
(σ2sidiz + σ
2
sie
)
2
dz, (A.4)
and
Φk(σ
2
sidi
, σ2sje, σ
2
sie
) =
∫ ∞
1
σ2sidiσ
2
sie
(σ2sidiz + σ
2
sie
)
2
× exp(−
∑
Sj∈Jk
2z − 2
σ2sjeγs
)dz.
(A.5)
From (A.4), we can readily obtain
Φ1(σ
2
sidi
, σ2sie) =
σ2sie
σ2sidi + σ
2
sie
. (A.6)
Additionally, letting
∑
Sj∈Jk
2z
σ2sje
γs
+
∑
Sj∈Jk
2σ2sie
σ2
sidi
σ2sje
γs
= t, we
have
z = t(
∑
Sj∈Jk
2
σ2sjeγs
)−1 −
σ2sie
σ2sidi
. (A.7)
Combining (A.5) and (A.7), we can obtain
Φk(σ
2
sidi
, σ2sje, σ
2
sie
) =
∑
Sj∈Jk
2σ2sie exp(φ)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
∫ ∞
φ
exp(−t)
t2
dt,
(A.8)
where the parameter φ is given by
φ =
2σ2sidi + 2σ
2
sie
σ2sidiγs
(
∑
Sj∈Jk
1
σ2sje
). (A.9)
By performing the partial integration to (A.8), the term
Φk(σ
2
sidi
, σ2sje, σ
2
sie
) is obtained as
Φk(σ
2
sidi
, σ2sje, σ
2
sie
) =
σ2sie
σ2sidi + σ
2
sie
−
∑
Sj∈Jk
2σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
exp(φ)Ei(φ).
(A.10)
Finally, substituting Φ1(σ2sidi , σ
2
sie
) and Φk(σ2sidi , σ
2
sje
, σ2sie)
from (A.6) and (A.10) into (A.3) yields (A.11) at the top of
the following page, which can be further obtained as
P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi[
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)
|Jk|+1
∑
Sj∈Jk
2σ2sie exp(φ)Ei(φ)
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
],
(A.12)
which completes the proof of (39).
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P SC-OJint =
N∑
i=1
αi[
σ2sie
σ2sidi + σ
2
sie
+
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Jk|
σ2sie
σ2sidi + σ
2
sie
] +
N∑
i=1
αi[−
2
N−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Jk|
∑
Sj∈Jk
2σ2sie
σ2sidiσ
2
sje
γs
exp(φ)Ei(φ)],
(A.11)
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